more complex reality than could be identified through a monocular positivist lens. Newer theories of human nature would have to expunge self-reliance, moral sentiments, and individual autonomy; they required a conception of remote causation that firmly distinguished epiphenomena from underlying reality. Intellectuals, confronting the dynamics, complexity, and interdependence of social life, had to find a way to assert the feasibility of comprehending that buzzing confusion of human actions, including their own.4 Grounded in evolutionary theory, the functionalist idea of individual adaptations to a continually changing environment offered a coherent model for penetrating beyond proximate causes, for grasping dynamic action rather than static structure, and for seeing complex connectedness rather than unilinear causation. For some, notably psychologists, the subsequent move from functionalism to behaviorism was relatively uncomplicated; many economists, political scientists, and sociologists endorsed behaviorism as well. Quite in keeping with these trends, the ideal research plans these workers advanced often contained concrete measures for amalgamating the disciplines into an integrated human science.5
Psychologists were particularly implicated in these intellectual developments, for their studies ostensibly penetrated beyond proximate causes and into the complex dynamics of human action. They also encountered most directly the problems of rationality in science as well as in everyday life, problems that simply were not addressed by the newer world view (which, therefore, left the way open for a reassertion of positivist epistemology). These concerns emerged not only in intellectual discourse but in the questions of organization and identity psychologists entertained after World War 1.
If the problems tackled by psychologists in the decades before the war had consisted of distinguishing themselves from philosophers, on the one hand, and from physiologists, on the other, and in demonstrating the practical virtues of psychological science, their war experience brought them considerable success. At the Armistice psychologists received other benefits besides their own impression of committed service: the creation of an environment, albeit temporary, for working collectively; the establishment of enduring contacts with government and industry; and a heightened public image.6 As James McKeen Cattell 5 Appeals for integrating the social sciences often identified psychology as the key discipline for linking the others. Dorothy Ross has convincingly argued that the social sciences' moves toward scientism bolstered their legitimacy as useful instruments in society and that those toward psychology, in particular, were reformist rather than reductionist because they delineated problems as psychological rather than as biologically fixed: "Development of the Social Sciences" (cit. n. All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions remarked, the war involvements "put psychology on the map and on the frontness employee or contractor in certain cases, and to submit to certain irritations for the probable common good."' 0 To Harvard-trained psychologists like Robert Yerkes, cooperative organization exemplified Josiah Royce's principle of the "fecundity of aggregation." Plans based on such corporate models inevitably carried the corresponding risks of entrepreneurship. Yet the Carnegie committee saw its cooperative plan as "boldly conceived and ambitiously launched with 'definite beginnings' but with 'brave endings' in view."11 Along with the internal issue of unity, psychologists confronted an external problem: that of psychology's public image. Historians of the 1920s have viewed the popularity of psychology as a "national mania" that reinforced a common pastime of narcissistic self-analysis. But in that decade of contradictions, a time of cynicism and pessimism as well as jazz and social liberation, psychology was also the subject of jest and criticism. Especially among journalists and intellectuals, disenchantment surfaced in biting criticism of "advances" such as mental testing and behaviorism.12 The challenges to psychologists' expert knowledge were compounded by the considerable public attention and support gained by psychoanalysis.
Psychologists reacted in various ways to these conditions outside the profession. Mental testers took to the popular press to defend testing. Critics of psychoanalysis described not just the faulty reasoning but the adverse psychological consequences of taking Freud seriously. Behind the public rebuttals was a more comprehensive defense of scientific psychology that continued prewar progressive arguments for social reform while augmenting the discipline's legitimacy. Arguments for the reconstruction of psychology played on images of impending social disorder. The social problems were various-growing divorce rates, delinquency, job dissatisfaction, immigrant assimilation, personality disorders, and culture lag caused by the rapid growth of science and technology and the retarded social accommodation to that growth. A reconstructed scientific psychology, particularly a social psychology, was held to be instrumental for attaining democratic social order and control. functionalist terms of individual adjustment and adaptation to a changing environment. Given the purported culture lag and an etiology locating these problems at the individual level, psychology became the obvious source for acquiring the necessary rational knowledge.13
Psychologists' self-designated role had roots in prewar reform sentiments, but during the 1920s even greater emphasis was placed on psychological expertise and, accordingly, on the fallibility of common sense. The argument in favor of guiding individual adjustment to social institutions was bolstered by the claim that ordinary reasoning was inferior to rational scientific thought. Thus John B. Watson talked about common sense as "crude" psychology. Edward Thorndike warned of the permanent limitations of the ordinary being or "half-educated man," and Max Meyer wrote a volume on the irrational psychology of "the other one. "14 But however vehement the proclamations of their superior rationality, psychologists, unlike physical scientists, self-consciously confronted their own personal and cognitive limitations. The distinctions between the psychologist and the person in the street were not yet so durably cemented. Hence Edwin G. Boring's 1928 presidential address to the American Psychological Association, in dealing with the pertinent issue of intellectual fragmentation and controversies, concentrated on the unappealing personal and emotional components of psychologists' work. Raymond Dodge vividly described the "perils" of the psychological researcher who "may get lost in the chaos of details and never emerge. I have known such lost souls." The researcher "may find himself in conflict with his colleagues or with the native inhabitants of the dark continent of ignorance, who voluntarily choose darkness rather than light and prefer prejudice to information. Not all of them live in Tennessee." Even Watson, who was perhaps the most arrogant in his scientific claims, confessed privately to occasional feelings of hopelessness in his quest to understand himself and others."5 By the 1940s these self-doubts and uncertainties were worked out, primarily 13 Social control and transformation of the backward laity by adjusting individual behavior became a common goal. The person in the street was portrayed as irrational, illogical, mentally deficient (as the Army testing program had shown), and neurotically self-involved (see n. 12). Many psychologists shared F. S. C. Schiller's hope that psychology might "invert the miracle of Circe and transform the Yahoo into a Man": Taintaluts, Before the "experiment" that was the Institute of Psychology underwent its five-year review, new plans practically left that center abandoned in the shadows. While Yerkes was stocking his primate laboratory and the Institute of Psychology was continuing its search for a mental tester (Clark Hull was finally hired in 1929), the talk around New Haven concerned a research center especially designed for "human behavior" studies. The aims of the proposed center resembled those of the Institute of Psychology-organized, cooperative, and integrative research-but were much grander in proportion. In considerable part, these schemes were devised by Robert Hutchins, then dean of the law school, and Milton Winternitz, dean of the medical school. Committed to the improvement of professional training and to advancing the knowledge of human nature in that training, both men initiated plans for modernizing their schools. "Modernization" in this case meant incorporating the functionalist perspective on human behavior and formally organizing the resultant interdisciplinary science. Both deans perceived the psychological branches of human science to be crucial for the practice of law and medicine. For some years Winternitz had been preoccupied with the medical profession's neglect of the human mind; the inadequacies were particularly evident at Yale, where, he believed, psychiatry had not merely lagged but "remained stationary." He regretted the passing of the general practitioner, whom he admired as an "empirical psychiatrist," and argued that specialization had attended to all other functional units "at the expense of the mind." Winternitz also sought "preventive medicine" against the circumstances of metropolitan life, which overtaxed the entire human system, and advocated remedial procedures that would adjust individuals to their occupations and environment.25 Although Adolf Meyer, a psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins, advised against it, Winternitz proposed to teach "behavior" in the medical curriculum as well as to ensure the organized interaction of research psychologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists.26 Meanwhile, the twenty-eight-year-old law school dean contemplated making American legal studies truly scientific, even experimental, and allying it with general human behavior studies. Writing in the journals of both fields, Hutchins advocated the alliance between law and psychology as a basis for legal research, pedagogy and practice. However, he did insist that psychology would be relevant only if it was "interested in human behavior, instead of in epistemology and cosmology." Psychology would offer a corrective to the fact that "the law proceeds on a common sense art of behavior, which fails to hold its ground in the face of scientific data."27 After independently preparing a handful of proposals, Winternitz and Hutchins combined their visions for an integrated research center in a proposal that Angell presented to the Rockefeller Foundation (whose Division of Social Sciences had succeeded the Rockefeller Memorial) in 1928. The result was plans for the Human Welfare Group, an elaborate network connecting those graduate and professional schools that dealt with the human sciences in any way. In fact, the arrangement was so elaborate that several descriptive pamphlets, one with twelve questions and answers about the Human Welfare Group, were published, along with a multipage flow chart linking the various schools, clinics, and departments (see Figure 1) .28 In the upper center of the chart, singularly placed in the middle of a star, was the Institute of Human Relations. While the Human Welfare Group was to deal with "ithe body of man in health and sickness, the mind of man as it appears normally and pathologically, and the relations of man to others and to his environment," the IHR had special responsibilities. To it was accorded the undertaking of systematic research to correlate knowledge from the various scientific branches. The IHR would strike down the superficial disciplinary boundaries and show how man is "'a composite made up of three elementsmind, body, and environment-in constant interaction and impossible of separation. Not one of these elements has in itself any reality," for they exist only in relation to one another. Research funds were allocated by individual departments, and the Executive Committee primarily provided advice and guidance. However, it did sponsor research projects on social problems-among them costly studies on juvenile delinquency, the assimilation of immigrants, automobile accidents, human relations in industry, business failures, college personnel relations, bank credits, and law enforcement. Concerning these studies, the rationale of the Executive Committee was straightforward: "In as much as the failures of man to make satisfactory adjustments to his environment constitute the most pressing problems from the social point of view and at the same time afford data not so readily available where the adjustment is satisfactory, attention is being focused in the first Institute cooperative projects upon areas in which there are such evidences of failure as disease, poverty, unemployment, and crime."32
The same document reiterated a rationale for the laissez-faire management of the Institute. The IHR was to be a "symbol of that synthesis of knowledge, for which need is now so widely recognized," which, through its physical existence and policy of a common working space, would encourage the "free intercommunication" and "informal contacts" requisite for cooperative work. In other words, it should keep researchers "constantly mindful of their common purposes. 33 The original organization emphasized "voluntary" and "informal" association and assumed that coercing researchers to modify their research plans or follow a blueprint would violate their academic liberty.34
In fact, the early years yielded neither cooperative research nor integrated theory but rather produced a considerable number of studies on social problems. The explanation given for the failure to generate cooperation and integration was threefold: the distribution of funds to individuals or departments inhibited the voluntary association of scientists; the sensationalism of the applied work overshadowed the slow and subtle progress on scientific theory; and the tendency of established, mature scientists to continue working independently in accustomed ways blocked cooperation.35 The simple theory that propinquity would generate collective scientific practice had to be amended. This realization led in 1932 to a proposal for systematizing all research projects and then, in the following three years, to various critical appraisals and alternative plans. The 1932 proposal, submitted by Mark May, contained a "hypothesis" about personality and social structure that would provide a theme for unifying the biological and social sciences. May's "working theory" was a dual-aspect view in which the individual and social organization were recognized as constituting the same reality. The proposal offered a systematization of specific research projects and equally explicit directives for organizing research personnel. "Specialists," with the assistance of "field workers" and "office staff," would collect data on one precisely defined aspect of the central theme, and the "general director" would take responsibility for incorporating the data into the overall system.36 Although President Angell personally approved of May's systematization, nothing concrete emerged from the proposal.37 Other IHR members, although satisfied with the general working environment, were similarly discontented with the absence of cooperative work and unified theory. Raymond Dodge was the next to explore alternatives, and although he, too, embraced the idea of systematization, his model was at once less bureaucratized and more demanding than May's. Dodge argued that the Institute had multiple responsibilities of producing socially beneficial science and questioned whether these obligations would be met if left to the participating scientists. He eschewed the "piece-work method in which a director sets the problems" and the staff "become extra manipulating hands." The real question was whether a "community of aims" could be identified empirically; given that the IHR was an experiment, the experimentalists should ascertain the "facts" about the viability of such a community. Dodge's solution to the general organizational problem implied a special understanding of science: science comprises the free enterprise, or the "intellectual capital," of the individual scientist's mind, yet it simultaneously depends on group activities. The "community of aims" of free and mature investigators included a responsibility to find the thread of continuity uniting them all. In other words, it required a collective and inherently social "systemization. "38 As they prepared for the Institute's five-year review in 1934/35, the Executive Committee also attended to the apparent disorganization. Several young researchers were hired in the belief that they would be more flexible and more willing to engage in a cooperative integrated science than the older scientists. To ensure centralized control, a full-time director, Mark May, was appointed. Funds were transferred from the inpatient psychiatric services to support the director and research assistants. This move also served to free the Institute of units that resisted integration, notably the Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene programs, Arnold Gesell's Child Guidance Clinic, and Yerkes's primate laboratory. Finally, the director was given full control of research funds.39
Rockefeller officials approved of these amendments, for they were disappointed by the Institute's administrative and research complications. The Foundation nevertheless continued to endorse "pure" scientific research on social and mental life as well as the idea of interdisciplinary work. The Rockefeller Foundation Director of Social Sciences, E. E. Day, wrote that the Institute still promised to contribute to "our fragmentary and frightfully inadequate knowledge of Hull's moves to restructure the Institute entailed developing a concrete research agenda. His working blueprints for the collective study of foodseeking, hunger, frustration, and conflict in animals and humans-all of whom were to be housed in the Institute-were ultimately discarded in favor of the general subject of motivation, a topic that was being considered by other members. Hull decided to conduct a seminar on two competing motivational theories: psychoanalysis 42 The reason for holding a seminar, especially one that posed two antagonistic theories, was not solely to ensure the propinquity or voluntary association of scientists. The idea was grounded in Hull's psychological theory of the researcher. In turn, this very psychology constituted the foundation for creating a unified science of human relations. Like many other psychologists, Hull was periodically distressed by the faulty cognitions and (social) misconduct of researchers. As to the first, he found scientists frequently failed to employ logical reasoning, to apprehend the obvious and correct solution to a problem, or to eliminate subjectivity and metaphysics.46 As to the second, they were often unruly social agents who would resist acknowledging another's achievements, jealously guard their own findings, and impulsively persevere in a research tactic without any corroboration. The latter, basically "social," problems became a case study from which Hull began to construct a general theory of social behavior. The theory would explain the counterintuitive occurrence of such social behaviors as cooperation, altruism, eminence, prestige, and imitation. These socalled social acts needed no special theoretical constructs, for Hull believed that they could be explained parsimoniously by reference to individual behavioral acts-specifically, to reinforcements and drive reduction in the individual organism. Just as Hull believed that the failure to achieve coordinated behavior was due to conditions of the environment, so too he thought that the insolvency of coordinated and unified scientific research was due to defects of the institution.
The question of what enabled successful joint scientific undertakings was identical with the question of why animals share resources, the latter being a problem that he loosely connected with the existence of social dominance. Thus his speculations on the problems of the IHR frequently evolved into discourse on a fundamental theory of social behavior and then into specific designs for experiments on the social behavior of birds, rats, the feebleminded, or children. 47 Hull conjectured that a seminar format would enable the participating scientists to provide checks on each others' reasoning processes and force a collective or "semi-communistic" project to emerge; hence, it would reduce irrational and antisocial tendencies in the group. He remained concerned that a seminar might still digress into "public controversy" or fail to prevent the hoarding of research ideas.48 Yet his ideal research model, though for the present unimplemented, would eliminate these contaminants and guarantee the rational and logical production of knowledge. Scientific research, he thought, could proceed most economically if structured like a psychic machine, an automatic mechanism free from subjectivity.
Hull offered a behavioral explanation for scientific thinking whereby the purported components of intelligence, insight, and purposiveness actually are explicable in terms of a long trial-and-error process.49 The process is actually a result of the conditioned reflex, "an automatic trial-and-error mechanism which mediates blindly but beautifully, the adjustment of the organism to a complex environment." In scientific work these activities become systematized, metaphysical entities are discarded, and empirical tests perfect the mechanism. Once the behavioral explanation of mental states is derived, "it should be a matter of no great difficulty to construct parallel inanimate mechanisms, even from inorganic materials, which will genuinely manifest the qualities of intelligence, insight and purpose, and which in so far, will be truly psychic. "50 The psychic machine that would produce the higher mental acts of reasoning, intelligence, insight, and foresight had an analogue at the level of scientific labor. The building of unified theory demanded an assembly line of workers from all the sciences. Physics would supply the deductive base of the mechanical system of scientific work.5' Within psychology, tasks would be divided according to their logical and mathematical and their empirical components. Hull conjectured that the scientific project required the making of hundreds of equations and empirical constants and thousands of theorems and experiments: "This great task can be no more than begun by the present generation of workers. Hope lies, as always, in the oncoming youth, those now in training and those to be trained in the future. Upon them rests the burden of the grinding and often thankless labor involved." Given the trial-and-error nature of all learning and the magnitudinous undertaking of unified theory, scientific work would generate some error-but nothing compared to the folly produced with the current disorderly practices and individualism among researchers.52 With the mechanical system, the theoretical "chaos" in the house of psychology would be put in "order" and unified science would be unfolded.53
As an incarnation of Hull's methodological mechanics, the Institute seminar would approximate the ideal of scientific practice and would eventually yield integrated and unified science. The assignment of experimental duties to various members would complete the logical empirical engine. And the topic of psychoanalysis and behaviorism was an especially well-suited fuel. To Hull, Freudian psychology best symbolized unwanted subjectivity, the hazardous pollution of illogic and metaphysics.54 Comparison of the two theories really meant subsuming psychoanalysis in the theory of stimulus-response conditioning. The project simply required the logical translating and operationalizing of psychoanalytic concepts and the experimental testing of hypotheses derived from psychoanalytic theory. To Hull fell the responsibility of demonstrating the superiority of the stimulus-response system, a task that required both his scientific expertise and 49 Hull's program flourished, and his leadership was respected. Although Hull himself preached democracy and believed that the fuhrer-like figure needed at the Institute contradicted American ideals, he solemnly acknowledged his crucial role in inducing the members to work toward cooperation, integration, and a unified science of behavior.56 Others willingly praised Hull's influence, and May eventually designated him the "planning and supervising architect, while his collaborators have checked the plans and supplied much of the technical skill necessary for their execution."57 Nevertheless, Hull was not openly regarded as a genius to be venerated or a corporate head to be heeded but as the conveyer of a scientific methodology that approximated the ideal of physics and the perfect research machine. The methodology of that working community demanded discipline, control, and order. It eradicated subjectivity, individual idiosyncrasies, and social deviance.
TOWARD UNIFIED SCIENCE
The success of Hull's planning depended upon the compliance of other Institute members. Since many of the components had also been proposed by others, and some had been implemented independently of his suggestions, its overall acceptance entailed no radical transformation. The orderly structure and simple rhetoric of scientific processes were familiar and alluring. Equally appealing was the supposedly unprejudiced receptivity to the most problematical of theories, psychoanalysis, and to nonpsychological concepts such as culture, history, and social structure. Hull's was a rigorous systematization; it appeared to threaten no particular research project while it unequivocally defined real and orderly relations between them all. The IHR participants had moved toward centralization of organization (through the directorship), regulation of social arrangements (through seminars and division of research labors), and structuring of research (through a psychological metatheory of the individual and environment and a mechanized methodology). These structural changes introduced a shared language to replace the idiosyncratic dialogues of individual researchers. The revised language of community did not so much represent an abrupt shift to psychological, formal, and logical theorizing as codify interests that had been in ascendance for some time. The new framework-linguistic and social-corrected a lag in researchers' self-conceptions. Although by the early twentieth century human scientists were acknowledging that human action is multicausal, interdependent, amoral, and irrational, they had not yet accommodated their self-conceptions to this modern outlook. Nor had they accepted the uncertainties of In a short time the seminars produced cooperative and integrative works. Hull's Wednesday night seminar immediately attracted devotees, and its progress was meticulously recorded in mimeographed notes. Within a year other seminars were established, one on concepts central to an integrated social science and others on special topics such as learning, culture, and psychoanalytic theory.58 The success of the seminars convinced many members that integrated research could not come from studies of social problems or from data banks filled with social facts but only from theoretical and methodological convergence. Psychoanalysis provided the community not just with fertile ideas but also with identity: this precarious "1.clinical" theory offered something of a collective projective test where members could concur at once on the truths of human nature and on the inadequacy of clinical or subjective methodologies. The seminar revolved around the question, not "Psychoanalysis or no psychoanalysis?" but rather "How much psychoanalysis?" The solutions entailed making Freud's work scientifically verifiable and logically coherent. The clinician and the experimentalist, the behaviorist and the psychoanalyst, the analyzed and the unanalyzed, could often reach agreement with a shared methodology and division of work. In addition, physical scientists were occasionally invited to the seminar to demonstrate how methodological orderliness leads to unity. They were perceived to have the correct mental mechanisms (primarily deductive and inductive logic), the "courage," and the aesthetic tastes required to complete the tremendous tasks at hand. To acquaint themselves with these mental abilities, seminar participants were requested to read Newton's Principia. 59 Although the changes were primarily methodological and less in underlying assumptions about human behavior, the consolidation of research engendered by the Institute's new organization had almost immediate fruits. The publications bore the mark of what came to be recognized as the "logical empirical" methodology. Earlier works lacked the novel terminology but not the guiding assumptions. 60 The first large-scale project was a study of aggression conducted by eight members and published in 1939. The researchers employed Hull's model of identifying logical and empirical components of the research problem along with Freud's account of frustration; they derived the hypothesis that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration." Using Freud's claim that aggression follows when an individual is frustrated in his or her striving for some pleasurable outcome, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, perhaps more lucidly than any other Institute project, contrasted the irrational, impulsive, and amoral stuff of human nature with the rational, orderly, and rigorous procedures of a hypothetico-deductive method. The very act of cooperative research, though admittedly frustrating, indicated the potential of the methodology to transcend (or suppress) irrational tendencies.61 Soon afterward another collectively authored volume on rote learning appeared, along with a plethora of experimental studies grounded in the new integrative social science approach. 62 Accompanying the rhetoric championing mathematical and deductive methods -on the supremacy of a specific scientific reasoning-was the presupposition that all human behavior consists of individual adaptations to the environment. Governed by the inner workings of habits and drives, these adjustments were held to be blind yet to serve the individual's pleasure seeking; environmental adaptations ensure the individual's survival in an indifferent biological and social world. Whether "inner" or overt, the behavioral habits of the individual organism were held to be the atoms amenable to study through an integrated science; neither physiological processes, social structure, nor unobservable psychical entities were essential to explaining human behavior. What was absolutely necessary was a methodology free of primitive social practices (metaphysics, unprincipled or profligate behavior) and faulty inner habits (emotionalism, partiality, irrationality), along with a community of workers willing to control their own natural tendencies to behave unscientifically.
The evident moves toward unified theory occurred even as Rockefeller officials decided to curtail support of the Institute, awarding only a terminal grant of $700,000 for the period 1939-1949. Although Foundation officials were optimistic about current operations, they were critical of the earlier failures in productivity and organization.63 The unfavorable decision undoubtedly was also influenced by the Foundation's diminished interest in pure research in the social and psychological sciences.64 Nevertheless, the terminal grant was sufficient to maintain the Institute, and with the entry of the United States into World War II, the attention of the IHR members was shifted to war-related activities.
In 1950 Mark May reviewed the first twenty years' work and outlined the task that lay ahead for the Institute: continued integration of the biological and social sciences and research on "inner habits" and "inner speech." But the most immediate problem of the IHR was that of financing, and the results were both partial and temporary. A Ford Foundation grant enabled the Institute to hire five postdoctoral researchers, representing five disciplines, who were to develop an integrative theory. Like their predecessors, these researchers convened in seminars, published a collectively authored text, and ultimately reproduced the achievements of Hull's system.65
CONCLUSION
In 1939 Time published a brief account of the Institute that troubled many of its personnel. Entitled, "For Freud, For Society, For Yale," the article intimated that the similarities between the pretentious and phony temple of science in Sinclair Lewis's Arrowsmith and the IHR went further than the fact that they were both located on a Cedar Street.66 In no small manner the Institute did attempt to serve Freud, society, and the university. Yet it also served a crucial social function for human scientists who were adopting assumptions about an irrational and impulsive human nature, an uncertain reality, a disorderly society in need of control, and a segmented intellectual community requiring unification. Such intellectual interests had become commonplace in the early twentieth century, but human scientists had yet to confront some unanticipated consequences of this revised intellectual outlook. When viewed reflexively (when the ideas were applied to the activities of human scientists), that outlook challenged the human scientists' vantage point as rational and objective knowers. However, residual commitments provided an escape, a return to certainty-and hence an ultimate failure to consider the newer ideas seriously. The IHR researchers, like many others, relied on mundane knowledge about social organization. They also returned to tacit notions that the human sciences must ultimately have an anchoring point or some prime unit in reality, that this point was individual behavior, and that they must provide certainty-they must, in fact, be "science" as it was ordinarily construed. The Darwinian revolution, theories of the unconscious, pragmatism, and critiques of positivism and idealism had enlightened intellectuals about human nature but had also inadvertently endangered human scientists' authority.
The IHR became just one project to locate such foundations and thus to substantiate a model of human nature and science. The product in many ways resembled an earlier world view. The project's designers recognized the necessity of attaining order within the intellectual community: the "rugged individualism" of the nineteenth-century scholar was no longer a tenable ideal, given the newly acknowledged magnitude of the enterprise and of the inadequacies of the human intellect. Certainty amounted to consensus, although the pragmatic basis of this criterion of truth was rarely noticed. The ideals of democracy in science likewise required revision, because total freedom in intellectual pursuits spelled susceptibility to idiosyncratic reasoning and disintegrated scholarship. Research required organization and control. The traditional ideals of individual enterprise and democratic practices were gradually replaced by ideals specifying control and order, by metaphors of corporate life, and by methods abstracted from the "higher" sciences. In a very real sense the IHR was an experiment in science. This experiment in social arrangements contributed to salvaging the human sciences from the risks of self-reflection and from the pluralism of laissez-faire pragmatist philosophies; it offered a more mechanical, realist, and formalist vision of the human world. Among the disciplinary constituents in this transformation, psychology-the science of the individual and of the so-called less obvious dimensions of social life-was the most assiduous pupil and the chief beneficiary. The experiment yielded certainty for the scientists themselves as well as for their knowledge claims, and it did so through a language of social control. In a retrospective account one IHR participant applauded the multiple virtues of control:
Life would be unbearable in a world where one was constantly having to choose. Uncertainty is exhausting and choice demands special psychological strengths and reserves. It is, therefore, a human necessity that the world be, to some extent, predictable. Behavior must flow along at least some of the time in golden quiet. Man needs orderly knowledge, scientific knowledge, a kind of knowledge which permits him to act most of the time without the excruciating necessity of choice. . . Orderly knowledge is easier to teach and easier to learn, because one item in theory suggests another. A correct theory simplifies human problems and makes individual choice easier.67
Like others, John Dollard was disturbed by the mere perception of choice and the unavoidable circumstance (of reflexivity) that human scientists are both subject and object of their science. The formative decade of organizing researchers at the IHR illustrates several consequences of reflexivity in the human sciences. Among the solutions to the inadvertent reflexive thinking was the belief that controlled and orderly work arrangements would eliminate subjectivity and the ambiguities of choice. The fate of behaviorism and the recurrent crises in the psychological sciences generally intimate that such problems have not dissipated. Yet just as American human scientists have attempted to dismiss the properties of reflexivity, so those who chart the history of these sciences have embraced practically the same guiding assumptions. These historians tend to accept the presupposition that human scientists, with the possible exception of those doing applied work, can stand somewhere outside culture, history, and even themselves. When the "personal" or "social" involvements of the human scientists are acknowledged, it is usually in terms of idiosyncratic personalities, interpersonal frictions, or simple political biases. Human scientists are rarely perceived as both producers and consumers of, directors of and participants in, cultural knowledge. Perhaps this approach is continued because most histories of the human sciences are prepared by individuals trained in those sciences who hence retain a particular scientific ethos. Whatever the reasons, reconsideration of this presupposition might well introduce substantial changes into historical studies of the human sciences.
